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Abstract 
For financially repressed economies, financial liberalization was expected to allow for 
positive real interest rates, and for stimulating the mobilization and efficient allocation of 
domestic financial resources. At the same time, as the market becomes competitive the 
costs of intermediation go down, an indication of efficiency in the intermediation of 
financial assets. But, for successful liberalization, prerequisites must be put in place 
together with proper sequencing procedures. 
The study explored the sequencing and actions so far taken in the liberalization process 
in Kenya. The study also examined the interest rate levels, spreads and determining factors, 
as an indicator of financial sector response to the reform process. 
The study found that although much had been accomplished, the financial system 
was characterized by repression factors including negative real interest rates, inefficiency 
in financial intermediation and underdeveloped financial markets. This may indicate that 
the economy is facing secondary financial repression. Interest rates were more responsive 
to the policy activities during the period than to the fundamentals. Interest rates were a 
monetary phenomenon with an adjustment speed of 77% to disequilibrium in the monetary 
sector. The study concluded that there are several loose knots that need to be tightened 
for the economy to experience significant positive effects of financial liberalization. 
I. Introduction 
Macroeconomic background 
The impressive economic performance that Kenya experienced after independence (1963) 
has not been sustained, with external and internal shocks creating macro imbalances. 
The economy was hit twice by oil crise in 1973/74 and 1979, and by severe drought 
conditions in 1979,1984 and 1992. As a result, terms of trade deteriorated with increased 
import prices. Earnings from exports went down with the declining export prices and 
reduced volumes of traditional exports. Balance of payments worsened as the current 
account deficit increased. At the same time, inflation rates accelerated, reaching double 
digits, while the shilling exchange rate depreciated. This resulted in increased costs of 
production and reduced investment with limited foreign exchange for importation of 
essential inputs. Consequently, GDP growth rate slowed. 
During the first decade GDP growth rate averaged 6.6%, with inflation of 3%. 
However, the oil crisis resulted in increased inflation, recording 19.1% in 1975 and 22.3% 
in 1982. GDP growth fell to 3.1% in 1975 and went down further to 2.3% and 0.8% in 
1983 and 1984. Terms of trade worsened, dropping by 22% between 1972 and 1975. 
Although there was an improvement with the coffee boom in 1976/77, terms of trade 
dropped again by 28% in 1980. As a result, the current account deficit as a ratio to GDP 
increased from about 4% in the early 1970s to 14% in 1980, reducing marginally to 
12.5% in 1991. Table 1 summarizes the growth trends of selected economic indicators. 
In an effort to contain the external shocks on balance of payments and inflationary 
pressure, various control measures were introduced. They comprised selective restrictions 
on bank lending, licensing of foreign exchange transactions, restrictions on most imports 
and price controls on goods. The controls were lifted with the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes, however. The deteriorating economic performance squeezed 
the government's resources, with shortfalls in revenue relatively higher than expenditure. 
The situation worsened in the early 1980s with the overall deficit recording 8.9% of 
GDP in 1981, compared with less than 3% in the 1960s. Budget rationalization introduced 
in 1985 aimed at cutting government expenditure. However, by 1987 the fiscal deficit 
was as high as in 1981, averaging 7.2%. Another attempt at tight fiscal policy was made 
beginning in 1990 to cut government expenditure, but by 1993 fiscal deficit was as high 
as in 1987. 
Structural adjustment programmes were implemented beginning in the early 1980s. 
The first phase was in 1980-1984 with the broad approach and the second phase 1985-
1991 with the sectoral approach. Although the aim was to revitalize the growth of the 
Table 1: Selected economic indicators for Kenya, 1980—1995 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Annual inflation rate - 13.8 12.6 22.3 14.5 9.1 10.7 5.7 8.7 12.3 13.3 15.6 19.8 29.5 46 28.8 1.< 
Real GDP growth rate 3.9 6 4.8 2.3 0.8 4.8 5.5 4.9 5.1 5 4.3 2.3 0.5 0.1 3 4.! 
Real exchange rate (Index) 112 122 110.6 104.1 102 99.7 101.1 100 99.6 104.1 113 108.1 114 128.8 145.8 145 
Export quantum index (1990=100) 89 84 82 79 78 81 93 90 95 94 100 103 103 121 137 142 
Export price index (1982=100) 82 91 100 94 144 142 152 126 145 156 169 216 244 438 450 494 
Import quantum index (1990=100) 127 99 84 66 78 72 85 89 100 105 100 93 90 95 121 141 
Import price index (1982=100) 68 87 100 128 131 155 147 149 164 198 238 265 307 486 445 513 
Terms of trade index(1982=100) 119 104 100 94 110 92 103 85 88 79 71 82 76 90 101 96 
Government deficit (%GDP) 4 8.9 6.3 3.3 3.9 4.4 4.8 7.2 4.2 3.4 3.8 6.7 2.8 7.4 6.4 -
Financing of deficit (Ksh) domestic sources: 
Banking sector -116 1936 2497 -70 658 729 2619 5923 -78 226 -329 8996 -468 -7997 -2881 -
Non banking sector 804 1028 1487 1435 2060 2790 4914 2960 4428 1534 1644 1605 7366 25376 27286 -
Net foreign borrowing 1748 2764 1108 1307 715 939 -1900 542 1522 4000 6024 4130 230 6360 560 -
Investment GFCF 
(annual change (%)) 27.7 24.1 19.6 18.8 18.4 17.5 19.6 19.7 20.3 19.5 20.3 19.3 17.9 17.6 19.2 21. 
Change in stocks (annual change(%)) 6.3 4.4 2.9 2.9 2.7 8.1 2.2 4.7 5 5.4 3.5 2 0.4 0.7 0.4 0. 
Investment financing: 
External financing (%) of the total 44.4 40.4 37.4 11.9 19.3 14.6 13.6 32.9 32.5 37.8 36.6 26.4 21.1 6.7 6 24. 
Domestic savings (%) of the total 55.6 59.6 62.6 88.1 80.7 85.4 86.4 67.1 67.5 62.2 63.4 73.6 78.9 93.3 94 75. 
Source: Economic Surveys, various issues; Central Bank Quarterly Reviews. 
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economy, the achievements were minimal. Inflation dropped marginally during the second 
phase, but more than doubled in the third phase, recording 46% in 1993. Government 
attributed the accelerated increase in the rate of inflation to several factors: increased 
money supply in excess of the targeted level, depreciation of the Kenya shilling, erratic 
weather conditions, price decontrols, and the activities of the multi-party election in 
1992. 
Government deficit also worsened during the third phase despite the tight fiscal policy. 
The re-emerging deficit was attributed to the significant proportion of the government 
budget spent during the 1992/93 multi-party elections, public management of the famine/ 
drought relief, efforts and the administrative and security costs of managing the influx of 
refugees fleeing from civil wars in some neighbouring countries. The other major factor 
was domestic borrowing that saw the placement of government securities at increasing 
interest rates resulting in domestic payment growing by nearly twice as fast as the domestic 
debt. Investment as a percentage of GDP declined from 24.8% in 1980-1984 to 23.9% 
in 1983-1991 and 19.6% in 1992-1995. At the same time financing continued to rely 
heavily on domestic sources with reduced external financing. Similarly, financing of 
government deficit increasingly relied on domestic sources. 
The external sector recorded improved performance in the 1990s, with exports 
increasing at a higher rate than imports. This resulted in reverting the merchandise and 
service accounts from a deficit of Ksh3,146 million in 1992 to a surplus of Ksh5,576 
million in 1993. Exports increased by 25.8% during the third phase and imports increased 
by 11.8%. Export prices rose faster than import prices due to the large depreciation of 
the Kenya shilling. Terms of trade improved and the current account recorded a surplus 
in 1993 and 1994. The capital account also had a large surplus, reflecting substantial 
inflow of short-term and long-term capital. As a result, the overall balance of payments 
improved from a deficit of Ksh8,661 million in 1992 to a surplus of Ksh25,682 million 
in 1993. 
Gross domestic product declined in 1990-1993 with an average rate of growth of 
1.8% compared with 5.1% in 1985-1989 and 3.6% in 1980-1984. The deterioration 
was attributed to various factors including: unpredictable scenario with the first multi-
party elections in 1992, eruption of ethnic clashes in one of the most agriculturally 
productive regions in the country and bad weather conditions with below average rainfall 
leading to low output of the agricultural sector. There was also uncertainty in the financial 
sector about mounting of reform policies and liberalization of interest rates, and the 
withholding of foreign aid by donor countries led to scarcity of foreign exchange. The 
consequent drop in importation of raw materials by manufacturers reduced the growth 
rate in capital formation in the manufacturing sector. An improved growth rate was 
recorded in 1994/1995, however. 
Financial sector growth 
Kenya had a well developed financial system by 1996, made up of 51 commercial banks, 
23 non-bank financial institutions, 5 building societies, 39 insurance companies, 3 
Table 2: Financial sector growth indicators for Kenya, 1980—1995 (quarterly term) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
M2/GDP (%) 31 30.3 31.2 29.3 28.8 26.7 30.4 31.2 29.5 31.3 31.5 33.6 33.8 40 41.3 41.9 
Currency M2 (%) 18.7 19.4 17.7 18.3 17.3 18.7 17.9 18.9 19.4 18.1 17.6 17.2 17.3 17.1 15.3 15 
Real discount rate -5.1 -4.6 -7.9 -0.6 3.8 -0.4 7.3 4.5 4.3 3.1 3.3 0.4 -7 -0.2 -5.8 21.6 
Interest rate spread 4.9 3.6 2.3 2,6 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.9 6.1 22.3 20 
Commercial bank 
Assets (% annual change) 6.5 11.1 17.6 4.6 14.7 4 30.3 14.6 6 15.7 20.9 19.3 39.2 28.5 35.6 20.5 
M2 (% annual change) -1.1 12.9 16.5 4.9 12.9 6.7 32.5 14.1 8.3 20.8 15.4 20.9 33.6 25.7 30.4 18.6 
Private sector credit 
(% of total) 78.6 69.7 61.3 68.8 68.6 69.5 63.1 59.7 64.9 66.6 59.3 62.4 67.6 69.4 62.2 66.4 
NFA (Ksh million) 2265 300 -2019 227 404 -1364 175 -2637 • •3627 -2499 5303 -8061 -6583 20201 13783 7393 
Commercial bank deposits 
Private deposits (% of total) 85.2 84.2 84.8 87.7 86.4 88.3 89.3 92.6 93.9 90.7 92.4 90.2 92.2 92.9 95 95.8 
Time & savings deposits 
(% of total) 55.4 56.7 59.6 57.2 55.7 58.7 60 62.9 65.2 62.4 62.3 63.8 62 59 69.2 74.3 
Source: Economics Survey, various issues Central Bank Quarterly Reviews. 
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Figure 1: M2/GPD ratio 
M2GDP = M2\GDP; M2rate = M2 growth rate; GDPRate = GDP growth rate 
Figure 2: Interest rate spreads 
MONSIX= MONTUEL- TBILLS= LEN»= 
TBI hhS= deprate= LEND- deprate= exr»ate= 
MONSIX = 6 - month deposit rate; MONTWEL = 12 - month deposit rate; deprate = deposit rate; exrate = 
exchange rate; lend = lending rate; tbill treasury bill rate 90 days. 
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reinsurance companies, 10 development financial institutions, 1 capital market authority, 
20 securities and equities brokerage firms, 1 stock exchange, 12 investment advisory 
firms , 57 hire purchase companies, several pension funds, 13 foreign exchange bureaus, 
and 2,670 savings and credit cooperation societies {Development Plan, 1997/2001). At 
independence Kenya inherited a financial system composed of the Currency Board of 
East Africa, a commercial bank sector dominated by foreign banks, and a small number 
of specialized financial institutions. The Currency Board, however, lacked monetary and 
financial independence. The government thus found it necessary to establish national 
monetary controls aimed at efficient operation of the monetary system. In May 1966, 
Central Bank of Kenya was established by an Act of Parliament with only 10 (mainly 
foreign owned) commercial banks. The set goal for the financial sector was to ensure its 
growth and stability so that it could stimulate growth in other sectors of the economy 
thus achieving a high economic growth rate. The narrow financial sector was characterized 
by government control on the allocation and pricing of financial resources. 
The inherited financial system expanded and became more diversified in the 1970s 
and 1980s especially with the government policy to encourage local participation in the 
financial system and setting up of specialized institutions to collect savings and finance 
investment through issuing new bank and NBFIs licenses (Table 2 summarizes the growth 
indicators of the sector). The number of commercial banks increased from 9 to 15 in 
1980, and by 1985 there were 23 commercial banks. In the 1960s, Kenya had fewer than 
10 NBFIs, but the number of institutions expanded and their deposits and liabilities 
increased as they strove to compete with existing commercial banks. Their asset base 
rose from Ksh6.4 million in 1980 to Ksh69.5 million in June 1994. The NBFIs' total 
deposits as a percentage of those of commercial banks increased from 37.9% to 66.0% 
between 1980 and 1990, declining to 65.9% in 1993. Their total credit in the same 
period rose from 33.8% to 76%, reducing to 65.6% in 1993. Out of the total NBFIs, 
38.5% were owned by commercial banks and 55.8% were independent institutions. 
Growth of the NBFIs was facilitated by the Banking Act 1968, which eased entry and 
minimum capital requirements. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government got actively 
engaged in the financial sector through establishment of several financial institutions. 
However, with the move toward divestiture, the two government-owned commercial 
banks (Kenya Commercial Bank and National Bank of Kenya) sold 40% of their shares 
to the public between 1988 and 1996.1 
As the banking sector expanded and reform measures were instituted, assets and 
liabilities continued to increase. The M2/GDP ratio increased during the period of 
liberalization from 30.1% in the first phase of structural adjustment to 30.6% and 39.3% 
in 1985-1991 and 1992-19952 (Figure 1). During the same periods deposit liabilities of 
commercial banks increased by 10.25%, 15.7% and 26.4%, respectively. There was a 
noted decline in government and other public sector deposits, however, as the average 
annual change dropped from 17.7% to 42.5% in 1985-1991 and 1992-1995. Demand 
deposits decreased as a percentage of the total deposits as the time and savings deposits 
gained higher returns. There was an expansion in liquidity held by commercial banks, 
reflecting an increase in commercial bank balances at the central bank, banks' balances 
abroad and treasury bill holdings, due to the substantial increase in holding of government 
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securities. The average liquidity ratio rose from 21.6% to 27.1% and 43.8% in 1980-
1984, 1985-1991 and 1992-1995. This was 7.1% above the minimum statutory 
requirements in 1985-1991 and almost double the statutory requirement in 1992-1995. 
NBFIs acted as competitors to the commercial banks. Their deposits followed trends 
similar to those of commercial banks with the structure of deposits barely changing. 
Their deposits rose by 12.2% in 1992-1995 compared with 17.7% in 1985-1991. Deposits 
of the central and local governments declined by 6.8% in 1992-1995, while those of 
other public and private sectors decreased by 9.3%. The decline reflected a narrowing 
sector as NBFIs converted to commercial banks. NBFIs played an important role in 
mobilization of resources as reflected in the ratio of total liabilities of the NBFIs to total 
liabilities of the banking system, which stood at 61% in 1992 and 57% in 1993. Like the 
commercial banks, the NBFIs experienced increased liquidity with the liberalization 
process. The average liquidity ratio rose to 41.8% in 1992-1995, almost double the 
minimum statutory requirement. The high liquidity ratio was a result of increased holdings 
of treasury bills, balances with banks abroad and certificates of deposits. 
Challenges facing the financial sector 
As Kenya's general economic condition deteriorated in the early 1980s, the financial 
sector performance also went down. Despite having a diversified financial system, 
financial savings remained at a low level. The share of domestic savings held as financial 
assets with the financial sector averaged 30% in 1984-1987, similar to the levels in the 
1970s. Monetization of transactions fell from 34% to 30% and 29% in 1978-1980,1980-
1984 and 1984-1987.3 Although NBFIs were mushrooming in the 1980s, the financial 
system continued to be dominated by the commercial banks with about 70% of the total 
loans and advances in 1988. Four commercial banks accounted for 58% of bank deposits 
and 65% of bank assets. In the allocation of credit, the government took a substantial and 
vising share of loanable funds to finance the budget deficit and fund parastatals. The 
share of government net domestic credit rose from about 20% in 1978 to 38% in 1986. 
Funds were mobilized with the imposition of high liquidity requirements on banks and 
NBFIs. In 1986, the sector faced a crisis with most of the institutions experiencing 
undercapitalization problems. 
The situation was attributed to the various constraints facing the sector and resulted 
in the mounting of a financial sector reform programme. Among the constraints were: 
8 central bank regulatory differences across financial institutions, especially between 
commercial banks and NBFIs, and among the financial instruments 
0 inadequate regulatory and legal frameworks for the financial system, together with 
weakness in prudential supervision 
9 weak monetary policy control by the central bank 
0 segmentation of the financial sector by activities 
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Central bank regulations 
Different central bank regulations were applied to commercial banks and NBFIs. For 
example, commercial banks were subjected to lower loan rate ceilings, higher liquidity 
requirements and limits on private sector credit expansion. They could not levy non-
interest fees and service charges, were governed by a variety of liquidity and prudential 
requirements and were supervised more closely by central bank. With the different 
regulations, the NBFI sector expanded rapidly in the 1980s. Commercial banks set up 
NBFIs to circumvent central bank regulation and supervision. However, the low entry 
barriers and inadequate supervision of NBFIs rendered many of them undercapitalized 
and poorly managed. As they increased their competition with the commercial banks, 
NBFIs invested in riskier assets, mismatched asset and liability maturities and offered 
higher interest rates on term deposits, squeezing their margins. By 1985/86 a credit squeeze 
resulted in the failure of four banking groups all owning NBFIs, and in 1987 the problems 
of liquidity and insolvency spread to more parts of the NBFIs sector. 
The differences in effective loan and deposit rate ceilings contributed to the 
segmentation of the financial market by maturity and risk. The undifferentiated ceiling 
in terms of maturity or sector gave no incentive to the commercial banks to broaden their 
loan maturities or seek new clients. They concentrated on short-term financing mainly 
using the overdraft facility. NBFIs were subjected to a higher interest ceiling, and were 
able to mobilize longer-term liabilities by offering higher deposit rates and provide more 
long-term funds to a broader clientele including small-scale firms.4 
For the financial instruments, debt financing benefitted from preferential tax treatment 
relative to equity financing, which was subjected to double taxation through both 
withholding tax on capital gains realized by individual investors and taxation of the 
premium realized by companies on sale of their shares. As a result, the demand for 
securities among investors dropped and the growth of the capital market was stunted. 
The rising costs of public issues reduced the incentive of firms to raise additional equity, 
encouraging them to become excessively leveraged. 
Regulatory and legal framework and the prudential 
supervision 
The regulatory powers of the central bank were limited under the Banking Act 1968, 
while enforcement of banking regulations and supervision of financial institutions were 
hindered by lack of staff and adequate information. These factors resulted in the growth 
of NBFIs and building societies in the 1980s. Again, to promote indigenous financial 
institutions the sector was subjected to low entry harriers, and less liquidity, capital and 
reserve requirements. With little supervision the increasing number of new financial 
institutions faced liquidity and solvency problems due to poor financial practices, fraud 
and mismanagement. It was not until after the collapse of several financial institutions in 
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L985—1986 that the government took steps to improve central bank ability to regulate 
and supervise NBFIs and building societies and impose more stringent licensing 
requirements for new institutions. 
Weak monetary policy 
Before the liberalization, government concentrated on direct monetary control tools, 
mainly credit controls. Ceilings were put on commercial bank credit to the private sector.5 
With these ceilings the central bank attempted to offset the effect of large fiscal deficits 
on monetary expansion. However, the ceilings were compounded by weak and selective 
enforcement which contributed to segmentation of the financial market. The ceilings did 
not apply to NBFIs, and they varied across commercial bank institutions with those 
government owned being particularly lax in their compliance. This resulted in government 
inability to control inflationary pressure stemming from expansionary fiscal policy, 
expansion of lending by NBFIs and government owned banks at a period of tight liquidity, 
and banks with tight ceilings pushing riskier clients to other banks and NBFIs. 
Segmentation of the financial sector 
To fill the gap in the financial market for long-term credit and equity, the government set 
up development finance institutions in the 1960s and 1970s. They were intended to 
provide equity and term loans to the industrial sector and long-term agricultural 
investments. However, the DFIs never managed to gain their independence in sourcing 
for funds and they continued to rely on government funding. As such, they constituted a 
significant financial drain on budgetary resources. DFIs faced other constraints including 
serious portfolio problems, which were unprofitable with large spreads and high arrears 
and were therefore financially unsustainable. Their presence worsened segmentation of 
the financial sector. Financial institutions were segmented in terms of economic activities, 
sources of funding for institutions and asset holding, so that commercial banks 
concentrated on short-term loans and agricultural loans for seasonal credit for farmers. 
.Mortgage banks concentrated on residential and commercial construction and 
development banks provided long-term loans. 
II. Financial reforms 
Theoretical issues in financial reform 
Developing countries financial sectors were said to be characterized by unsound financial 
institutions with the absence of prudent regulations and supervision; uncompetitive 
financial markets with a few commercial banks dominating the sector; the existence of 
informal financing; and segmented financial institutions in terms of activities and 
economic sectors, sources of funding for institutions and type of assets to hold. Other 
characteristics are statutory interest rate ceilings, where interest rate levels were set 
administratively; accommodation of government borrowing; and weak monetary controls. 
In these systems the central bank typically has limited control on the sector, serving to 
finance government deficits, conduct foreign exchange transactions for the government 
and ensure that institutions do not enter into liquidity problems. Due to these factors, 
then, developing countries' financial systems were said to be financially repressed. 
The concept of financial repression was popularized by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), to describe financial systems with policies that distort domestic financial markets, 
including inflexible interest rates, higher reserve requirements (that allowed the 
government to borrow at low costs) and credit controls. These authors argued that a 
repressed financial system interferes with economic development as the intermediaries 
are not well developed for mobilization of savings, while the allocation of financial 
resources among competing uses is inefficient. 
Developing countries operated with low interest rates aimed at increasing the level of 
investment, improving the allocation of resources among sectors and keeping financial 
costs down to avoid possible inflationary pressures. This supported the liquidity theory 
of interest in which Keynes argued for low interest rates to speed up the accumulation of 
capital. 
However, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that real interest rates kept 
below the market equilibrium increase the demand for investment but not the actual 
investment. Low interest rates are insufficient to generate savings, and even reduce 
savings especially if substitution effects dominate the income effect for households. On 
the other hand, low rates raise the expected profitability of investment projects by raising 
the net present value of future earnings from the project. The net effect is to raise the 
demand for funds without raising the supply of financial resources. The results are 
rationing of credit among the competing investors based on non-price methods as credit 
is allocated according to the quality of collateral, client's bargaining skills, political 
leverage and loan size rather than the expected productivity of the investment. 
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Thus, negative real deposit rates and lending rates adversely affect development, 
discouraging the accumulation of wealth in the financial form and limiting the rate of 
capital accumulation. With negative bank loan rates investors find it better to borrow 
and buy inflation hedges instead of investing, thus reducing the level of investment. 
Administratively set interest rates are not only low but lack flexibility. They make it 
impossible for financial institutions to adjust their lending rates to the changing cost of 
funding or to narrow their profit margins. This makes it impossible for many lending 
institutions to absorb any loss that may be incurred in lending to higher risk projects. 
Consequently, financial systems in developing countries concentrated on low-risk 
established projects, leaving the high risk projects with no funding. The DFIs, meant to 
provide long-term credit, are faced with portfolio problems attributable to weak 
accountability and poor financial practices and the capital markets - the alternative source 
of long-term funding - are at an infancy stage and trading largely in existing shares. 
This then limits the alternative sourcing of investment funds. 
Administratively set interest rates also expose depositors to low non-negotiable rates, 
and they cannot benefit from higher rates offered by banks competing for deposits in a 
free market. Banks are left with no incentive to mobilize deposits or compete for loan 
customers. At the same time low interest rates inhibit entry of new financial institutions, 
stilling competition in the banking sector, and cause capital flight leading to foreign 
exchange shortages if international capital controls are relatively ineffective at preventing 
capital outflows. The empirical significance of all these effects depends on the degree to 
which controls force interest rates to deviate from their equilibrium value. In particular 
the effects are likely to be strongest when there is a low nominal interest rate ceiling 
combined with a high inflation rate, resulting in highly negative real interest rates (Caskey, 
1992). 
It is advocated that financially repressed systems abolish or relax interest rate controls; 
eliminate or greatly reduce controls on allocation of credit; switch to market based indirect 
methods of money supply control; and develop money and capital markets. Flexible 
interest rates promote genuine competition, with savers and borrowers getting the best 
return. They allow more diversity in interest rate structure where institutions are able to 
consider lending proposals involving higher levels of risk since they are able to charge 
higher rates reflecting the risk component. Flexible rates also mean that borrowers without 
access to loans can get credit, and credit increasingly flows toward more profitable 
projects, ensuring economic growth. Flexible interest rates allow credit control, which 
though sometimes effective and useful in the shortrun, is difficult to design and administer 
in an efficient and equitable way. 
Financial liberalization theory, then, argues for improved economic growth through 
financial sector reforms. The supporters of financial liberalization base their arguments 
on the works of McKinnon and Shaw. According to the theory, positive real deposit rates 
raise the saving rate, thus increasing the flow of financial savings. Developing countries 
with repressed financial systems thus mounted financial reforms aiming at: mobilization 
of financial resources with increased amounts of domestic savings channeled through 
the formal financial sector, reducing the role of direct controls in determining the allocation 
of credit, increasing reliance on market based system of monetary control and broadening 
the range of domestic sources of finance. 
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Liberalization of Kenya's financial sector 
After successful economic growth with a relative degree of internal and external balance 
in the 1960s, Kenya experienced structural distortions in the 1970s with external shocks, 
financial imbalances and fiscal undiscipline. The country approached the IMF for financial 
assistance and terms for a standby agreement were agreed upon in August 1979. 
Disbursement was delayed, with the ceiling for government borrowing from central bank 
proving untenable. However, there was an urgent need for quick disbursement that 
coincided with the World Bank's decision to move into medium-term balance of payment 
support to help the country adjust to the oil price shock (Swamy, 1994). A planned 
industrial sector loan was converted into a structural adjustment loan in March 1980 
with the hope of effecting quick response in exports. Very little was achieved and the 
economic condition worsened, forcing the government to go back to the World Bank in 
1982. 
The second SAL was signed in June 1982. This was expected to pick up the unfinished 
agenda on trade reform and address reform in marketing, interest rates, energy and family 
planning. The economy seemed to stabilize by 1984, but at the expense of growth and 
consumption and with little effort towards structural adjustment. This was caused by 
design and timing problems, lack of compliance and no commitment among a small 
coterie of top civil servants (Swamy, 1994). 
With the combination of renewed macroeconomic imbalances and sluggish economic 
growth, the government re-examined the SAP implementation process and opted for a 
change from the broad approach to a sectoral approach after 1984. The main objectives 
of the sectoral approach were to: minimize adjustment costs; ensure adequate preparation 
for proposed reforms; develop consensus to sustain the process: and avoid straining the 
government implementation capacity. Kenya received various facilities from the World 
Bank during the second phase of SAP (1985-1991), including agricultural sector credit 
in 1988, a financial sector adjustment credit in 1989 and a health rehabilitation project in 
1991. 
Although the government recognized the constraints facing the financial sector as far 
back as the mid 1970s, no action was taken till the late 1980s. By the early 1980s there 
was growing pressure to maintain positive real interest rates, and to use the interest as a 
tool to promote monetary stability and economic growth. In Sessional Paper No. 1 
1986, various proposals were made to develop the financial sector including the 
establishment of secondary market, money market and capital market to improve 
competitiveness in the sector. 
A comprehensive financial sector adjustment programme was launched in early 1989 
(The Appendix summarizes the liberalization process of the financial sector). The main 
objective was to improve the mobilization and allocation of domestic resources. The 
reform constituted both institutional and policy reforms. Institutional reforms were 
designed to restore public confidence in the financial system and to upgrade the skills 
required to supervise and regulate financial institutions. They included strengthening 
prudential regulations and supervision of financial system, development and 
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jmp]ementation of specific restructuring programmes for weak and solvent financial 
institutions, development of a strong cadre of central bank and other banking professionals, 
and the development of a capital market (World Bank, 1992). The policy reforms involved 
reducing budget deficits and government reliance on domestic bank borrowing, developing 
more flexible monetary policy instruments, liberalizing interest rates, and improving 
efficiency of financial intermediation by removing distortions in financial resources 
mobilization and allocation. 
Interest rate liberalization 
Kenya, like many other developing countries, followed a policy of low interest rates, 
adjusting for inflation to maintain positive real rates. The main aim of this policy was to 
keep the costs of funds low, with the belief that cheap credit promoted development 
through increased investment. The use of interest rates to manage monetary conditions 
and mobilize and allocate financial resources in an efficient manner was neglected. 
Interest rates remained under the administration of the government through a regime 
of fixing minimum savings rates for all deposit-taking institutions and maximum lending 
rates for commercial banks, NBFIs, and building societies. Interest rates were calculated 
on a reducing balance method and levying of extra charges on loans was not allowed. 
Deposit savings rates were too low compared with the lending rates, widening the spread 
between the two. The inflationary pressure created by the first oil crisis made the interest 
rate negative in real terms. As indicated in the 1974-1978 Development Plan, the 
government saw the need to review the interest rates to encourage savings through the 
banks and to create a disincentive to forestall speculation and uneconomic use of savings 
by borrowers. In the 1980s, the interest rate policy was reviewed with the following 
objectives: (1) to keep the general level of interest rates positive in real terms in order to 
encourage savings and to contribute to the maintenance of financial stability; (2) to allow 
greater flexibility and encourage greater competition among the banks and non-bank 
financial institutions to enhance efficient allocation of financial resources - in particular, 
the policy strove to ensure that funds flowed into those areas that are most productive, 
with the biases against long term lending and lending to small business eliminated; and 
(3) to reduce the differential to maximize lending for banks and NBFIs. With liberalization, 
the interest rate policy aimed to harmonize the competitiveness among the commercial 
banks and NBFIs by removing the differential that had existed for maximum lending 
rates to allow greater flexibility and encourage greater competition in interest rate 
determination so that the needs of both borrowers and lenders could be better met through 
the cooperation of market forces and to maintain the general positive levels of interest 
rates in real terms in order to encourage the mobilization of savings and contribute to the 
maintenance of financial stability. 
The first review of interest rates in the post independent period was in June 1974, a 
decade after independence. Further reviews were made in the 1980s6 to allow commercial 
banks more room to compete and have flexibility in meeting the needs of customers, 
narrowing further the difference between NBFI and commercial bank rates. Also, it was 
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aimed at making interest rates responsive to changes in international markets to provide 
protection against adverse movements of funds internationally. In 1989 the ceilings on 
savings deposit rates for both commercial banks and NBFIs were progressively raised, 
while the ceilings on long-term bank loans were brought to the same level with the 
ceiling for NBFI lending. These moves harmonized interest rates across the institutions, 
allowing banks greater flexibility in varying rates according to loan maturities. However, 
the gap between the lending and deposit rate was not narrowed. In 1990 institutions 
were allowed to include all lending related charges and fees, so that the effective rates on 
loans could exceed stipulated ceilings. Treasury bill rates were fully liberalized in mid 
November 1990. This made it possible for the central bank to use the bill rate to influence 
the level of other short-term interest rates. Interest rates were finally liberalized in July 
1991. The immediate experience with interest rates was very promising, as they recorded 
positive real rates and the spread between the lending and the deposit rates narrowed. 
This was short lived, however, with the high inflationary conditions. A tight monetary 
policy was adopted to mop up the excess liquidity. Treasury bill rates increased, pushing 
up the interest rates. Commercial banks increased their deposit rates as they competed 
for deposits from the non-banking sector. The depreciation of the exchange rate and the 
increasing treasury bill rates worsened the inflationary condition. The interest rates became 
negative in real terms (Table 3) and the spread between the lending and deposit rales 
widened (Figure 2).With liberalization it is expected that the financial sector will grow 
and become efficient as information flows improve, while the low cost of intermediation 
leads to a closing gap between the lending and deposit rates. As efficiency improves and 
competition increases, then the spread is expected to narrow. So far, then, the results 
demonstrate a nonachievement of efficiency in banking intermediation. At the same time, 
the short-term deposit rates have continued to increase at a faster rate compared with the 
longer deposit rates so that the yield curve assumed a negative slope. 
Despite the efforts to introduce competitiveness, the banking sector seemed to gain 
an oligopolistic structure, with only a few institutions controlling the sector. Four major 
commercial banks continued to dominate, with more than 70% of the total deposit 
liabilities and a similar share of the loans market. With such a structure it was even 
difficult for the banking system to respond to changes in other price indicators, e.g., the 
improved exchange rate condition. As the country experienced exchange rate appreciation 
in 1994, banking institutions failed to reflect this in their lending rates. The central bank 
responded by calling upon the banking institutions to reduce lending rates so as to increase 
the demand for imports and allow for absorption of available foreign exchange. The 
central bank felt that it was only logical for the lending rates to come down to reflect 
change in inflation and the downward trend in treasury bill rates. In October 1994. 
dominant commercial banks responded by lowering their base rate as a step toward 
reversing the steady appreciation of the shilling. The lending interest rate was 
reduced by between 3% and 5%, sitting at a higher level than expected. The high 
lending rates7 discouraged borrowing from the banking sector and commercial banks 
accumulated more than minimum statutory requirements (Figure 3). 
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Interest rate liberalization was accompanied by other reforms including the floating of 
the exchange rate and trade liberalization. In the financial sector there was a move toward 
the use of indirect monetary policy instruments, including reserve ratios, variable liquidity 
ratios and liberalized market based interest rates. The government took measures to remove 
the policy and institutional constraints in the operations of treasury bill and treasury 
bond markets, including the attraction of auction, reforms in the lending mechanism and 
issue of a broader range of treasury bills. The period following the interest rate 
liberalization saw an upward review of cash ratio and liquidity ratio aimed at regulating 
the liquidity in banking institutions (Figure 4). 
The government sought to strengthen the legal and technical capacity of the central 
bank to carry out its regulatory and supervisory functions. The revised Banking Act of 
1989 enhanced the central bank's role in the inspection of institutions, establishment of 
reports, auditing and provisioning requirements, capital adequacy requirement and 
exposure units, and assessment of penalties against non compliant institutions. The act 
also subjected building societies to more stringent licensing and operating regulations 
similar to those of NBFIs while regulatory differences between NBFIs and commercial 
banks were reduced. With the 1991 amendment of bank laws, the central bank imposed 
stringent licensing requirements on banks and NBFIs, increased minimum capital 
requirements and tightened control on the use of government overdraft facilities offered 
by central bank. Further amendments were made to the Banking Act to strengthen the 
balance sheet of banks and NBFIs and to improve the framework for their supervision. 
The Central Bank Act Amendment of 27 October 1995 enhanced the ability of the bank 
to supervise the industry more effectively, protect small depositors, and foster financial 
prudence and discipline in the management of banking institutions. The amendments 
allowed locally incorporated financial institutions to expand branch networks outside 
Kenya, reduced credit to a single borrower to 25% of capital and institution from 10; 
harmonized the calender year for all financial years of the various institutions; reduced 
the period within which to publish audited accounts to three months from six months, 
granted central bank powers to approve external auditors, raised membership of the deposit 
protection fund to seven from five and established disclosure requirements for institutions 
covered by the fund. The amendments also stressed the professional and moral suitability 
for managers of banking institutions and subordinated all other law other than the central 
bank act to the banking law (Central Bank). 
Restructuring of the financial institutions intended to promote competition, reduce 
government ownership and control, balance the type of institutions (commercial banks, 
merchant, development and household savings banks), and upgrade services with ATMs 
and promissory notes. Following the bank failures in 1986, the central bank strategized 
to restructure the ailing institutions to preserve public confidence in the banking system. 
The exercise was planned in two phases. During the first phase the bank acted on 10 
ailing institutions, which were merged to form the Consolidated Bank of Kenya in 
December 1989. This was assisted with pay outs from the Deposit Protection Fund, 
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which had also been strengthened and recapitalized as part of the reform package. Also 
of assistance was the conversion of parastatal deposits into equity. The first phase was 
accomplished on schedule. The second phase also involved 10 institutions. It was designed 
to rely more on independent efforts by the shareholders of these institutions to inject 
capital and improve operational efficiency without upsetting the interest of depositors. 
This was not successful, however, due to the inability or unwillingness of the existing 
owners to take appropriate action and the inability or unwillingness of the bank to enforce 
its supervisory powers or come up with alternative solutions (World bank, 1992). As 
such, most of the institutions covered ran into serious liquidity problems. It is no wonder 
that by 1992, 11 commercial banks and 20 NBFIs were experiencing financial distress 
(Swamy, 1994). By 1996, 55% and 60% of the institutions were liquidated with the 
deposit protection fund. As a further step toward achieving competitiveness, and 
strengthening the monetary policy, in mid 1994 a move was made to converting NBFIs 
to commercial banks. It was argued that the majority of NBFIs had links through share 
ownership with the commercial banks and such situation permitted a great deal of inter-
company deposits and loans and allowed conflicts of interest to arise. The situation limited 
the effectiveness of monetary policy and the ability to control inflation. This was also a 
strong case for a regulatory regime that allowed institutions to stand on their own feet. 
The move was met with opposition from the banking sector, however. Insiders argued 
that while the rationale for putting NBFIs and commercial banks under the same umbrella 
was legitimate, the regulatory regime had no right to dictate to institutions how to organize 
their operations. They also argued that NBFIs should be left to retain their identity and 
maximize the comparative advantage they had evolved in the areas of consumer bills of 
exchange and term loans. It was estimated that the NBFls lend approximately two shillings 
for every three lent by the commercial bank. Again, the decision to transform them came 
at a time when banking institutions were required to raise their paid up capital and reserve 
from Ksh37.5million to Ksh75 million.8 It was felt that such a move would knock a great 
number of indigenous banking institutions out of existence. 
The central bank intended to promote stability in the system by solving the problem 
of under-capitalization, a common deficiency of indigenous banking institutions. This 
would allow growth of strong local institutions and induce local banking institutions to 
open up their shareholding to other investors, given that many of the ailing banks were 
individually owned. The Deposit Protection Fund Board was established to ensure stability 
of the financial market, thus protecting investors and depositors. By December 1996, 
38% of NBFIs had converted into commercial banks, 9% had approval to commence 
operations; 17% merged with parent banks and 4% converted to mortgage finance (Central 
Bank). 
Several policy and institutional measures were implemented to stimulate development 
of capital markets with the idea of broadening the existing market, increasing competition 
in the securities markets, encouraging secondary market development and improving 
the incentives for private capital. The reforms focused on enhancing the returns from 
equity investments, thereby reducing the bias favouring debt instruments. The measures 
implemented included: elimination of double conversion of dividends by converting 
withholding tax into final tax, exemption of withholding tax on the dividend income of 
Table 3: Real interest rates for seleted principal interests in Kenya, 1991-1996 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
Discount rate for 
treasury bills 7.5 6.4 5.6 5.4 -1.9 -3.2 -5.3 -5.7 2.2 26 16 -4.3 -1.5 -13 -14.4 -8.8 -0.5 8.9 18.1 19 20.8 14.9 16.1 
Advanced against 
treasury bills 9.8 8.7 7.9 7.7 -0.3 -1.2 -3.3 -6.1 4.1 29.7 20.2 -0.7 -12.7 -11 -12.4 -6.8 1.7 11.4 20.9 21.6 24.1 19.8 21.4 
Building societies 
deposits rate 4.8 4.1 3.4 2.9 -4.3 -5.6 -7.7 -10.4 -13.6 -16 -16.1 -20 -22 -22 -20.7 -6.6 0.9 9.8 14.3 15.2 13.9 10.3 8.3 
Commercial bank 
deposit rate 5.3 4.7 3.2 2.8 -4 -5.7 -7.6 -9.8 -12.7 -13 -11.4 -14 -20.1 -22 -18.2 -13 -4.5 2.6 8.7 10.9 11.4 8.9 6.9 
Commercial bank 
lending rate 9.4 8.7 6.3 6.4 -0.8 -1.9 -3.6 -6.1 -9.2 -8 -8.9 -9.4 -13.2 -12 -8.2 -2.6 6.6 15.1 22.7 27 24.7 22 19.7 
Post office savings 
bank rate 2 1.4 0.6 0.2 -6.7 -1.8 -10.1 -12.8 -15.8 -18 -20.4 -24 -27 -27 -23.2 -15 -8.6 -0.6 3.5 4.3 3.2 0.7 -1 
Inflation 8.8 9.5 10.3 10.8 19.1 20.8 23.5 27.3 31.9 35.3 39.4 45.5 50.6 50.1 43.2 29.3 16 6.6 2.4 1.6 2.7 5.2 7.1 
Source: Central Bank Economic Report and Quarterly Economic Reviews 
Real interest [(i - infiatlon)/(l + inflation)]"! 00 
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Figure 3: Liquid assets for commercial banks 
Exliquid = excess liquidity/deposit liabilities; Miniliquid = minimum liquidity/deposit liabilities; 
Ministatu = minimum statutory liquidity; Totexliquid = total excess liquidity. 
Figure 4: Unit root tests 
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corporate tax, tax exemption of bodies such as pension funds, elimination of corporate 
tax on dividend income of unit trusts, removal of capital issues committees' role in 
regulating share issues, abolition of stamp duties on retail share transactions, and tax 
deductability of all costs incurred in the issue of shares, debentures and bonds. The 
government also adopted a revised unit trust act to liberalize regulation for establishing 
and operating investment trusts. The Capital Market Authority was established in January 
1990, after a legislation providing for establishment of a capital market authority was 
passed by the parliament in November 1989. The legislation defined the roles and 
responsibilities of various participants and provided for the implementation of investor 
protection measures. CMA's mandate included the development of a securities industry. 
The stock exchange trading floor was established in 1991/92. 
Kenya pegged the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar before changing to a basket of 
currencies (SDR) in 1975. The system was modified in 1982 with the shilling pegged to 
a composite basket of currency representing the bulk of Kenya's external trade. In 1990 
a dual exchange rate existed with the official exchange rate and the foreign exchange 
bearer certificates. By 1993, the dual system operated with an inter-bank rate and official 
exchange rate . The two were then unified in October 1993 as the exchange rate was 
floated. 
III. Interest rate determination 
Our analysis shows that a lot was happening during the liberalization period. Interest 
rates were liberalized and indirect monetary policy tools adopted. Steps were taken to 
establish financial markets, decontrol foreign exchange, liberalize trade and tighten 
prudential regulations. The role of the central bank was strengthened and monetary policy 
was tightened. All these were accompanied by declining economic performance. From 
the financial repression theory, a major achievement in the financial liberalization is the 
decontrol of interest rates. This is expected to have a positive impact on economic 
performance and also to indicate the direction the financial sector is taking with the 
liberalization process. The section thus looks at the interest determination in a liberalized 
financial market. 
Theoretical framework 
Traditional theories define interest rate as the price of savings determined by demand 
and supply of loanable funds. It is the rate at which savings are equal to investment 
assuming the existence of a capital market. The loanable fund theory argues that interest 
rate is determined by non-monetary factors. It assigns no role to quantity of money or 
level of income on savings, nor to institutional factors such as commercial banks and 
the government. 
The liquidity theory, on the other hand, looks at the interest rate as the token paid for 
abstinence and inconveniences experienced for having to part with an asset whose liquidity 
is very high. It is a price that equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash 
with the available quantity of cash, and not a reward of savings. Interest rate is a function 
of income. Its primary role is to help mobilize financial resources and ensure the efficient 
utilization of resources in the promotion of economic growth and development. 
From the traditional theory, nominal interest rates adjust fully to the expected rate of 
inflation leaving real interest rates unchanged. In his works, Irving Fisher held the same 
sentiment?. He believed that there is a positive relationship between expected future 
price increases and nominal interest rate. An increase in price increases the nominal 
value of trade, resulting in an increase in demand for money and leading to an increase in 
nominal interest rate. Irving Fisher's theory is controversial, however, particularly when 
it is interpreted as suggesting a constant real interest rate. 
Earlier studies estimated the Fisher effect, i.e., the amount of change in nominal rates 
resulting from a change in the expected rate of inflation by basing their theoretical 
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expression on nominal interest rates as the sum of the real interest rates and expected 
inflation and a residual term. 
it = rr( + Bet 
I = nominal interest rates 
rr = real (ex-ante) rate of interest - expected real rate 
Be = expected inflation rate 
Real interest rates and expectations of inflation are not observable. Thus, specific 
hypotheses were maintained about real rates and formation of expectations. It was 
assumed, for example, that the real interest rate was a function of deeper economic 
variables like marginal rate of substitution and transformation and the rate of time 
preference, and because it moved or adjusted slowly, it was approximated as a constant. 
Empirical studies testing the Fisher effect found its magnitude less than one, suggesting 
that nominal interest rates are extremely slow to adjust to inflation, so that there is a 
tendency for the inflation rate to expand the gap between nominal and real interest rates. 
Tobin (1965) modified Fisher's conclusion by arguing that inflation reduces the demand 
for money balances, lowering the real rates of returns so that real interest rates are not a 
constant. 
To Fisher, the influence of change in the purchasing power of money on nominal 
interest rates depends on whether or not the change is foreseen. If it is not clearly foreseen, 
a change in purchasing power of money will at first affect the money interest rate. To the 
extent that changes in the purchasing power of money are foreseen, then theoretically it 
is possible to make allowance for the expected change in the unit value. To offset a 
foreseen appreciation, it is necessary that the rate of interest be correspondingly lower, 
while to offset unforeseen depreciation the rate of interest should be correspondingly 
higher. However, because of ignorance and indifference, depreciation and appreciation 
are never fully foreknown and therefore they are partially provided in interest rate. To 
Fisher, then, the change in value of money would not be fully reflected in nominal interest 
rate due to lack of foresight. 
From the Keynesian framework, changes in monetary expansion induce changes in 
the nominal rate of interest through the portfolio allocation behaviour of asset holders. 
The analysis concludes an inverse relationship between money and nominal interest 
rates, so that monetary expansion leads to lower interest rates. Changes in the nominal 
rate of interest are then translated to changes in real rates of interests, given that the 
elasticity of the real rate of interest to money is positive. This implies that nominal rates 
and expected inflows respond differently to change in policy, with expectation adjusting 
slowly to the changing economic environment. 
For monetarists the impact of a change in monetary policy on nominal rates of interest 
is influenced by the rate at which expectations adjust to new economic policy. With 
expansionary monetary policy the public expects a higher rate of inflation and the nominal 
rate of interest rises as lenders anticipate that demand will raise interest rates and borrowers 
will be willing to pay a higher rate. 
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Also in Angeloni and Prati (1993), evidence from the UK is quoted as supporting the 
Keynesian argument where monetary expansion resulted in lower interest rates, contrary 
to the monetary business cycle model where monetary expansion increases nominal rates 
of interest through inflationary expectation. It is argued that, initially, liquidity shocks 
and short-term interest are negatively related, but in the long run the effect is more 
controversial as these rates are presumably more affected by expectations about future 
growth and inflation, with exchange rate forming the key link. In small open economies 
where domestic monetary shocks tend to be offset by reserve outflows with no effect on 
interest rates, an increase in money supply reduces the interest rates. If money demand is 
interest elastic and interest rates fluctuate in international financial markets, a liquidity 
effect may exist but may not call for active monetary policy. 
Tanzi (1980) extended the Fisherian model to include influences of business cycle 
fluctuations. He argued that the divergence between realized and expected interest rates 
is influenced by business fluctuations. His results with only expected inflation found the 
value of the Fisher effect to be less than one, implying that not all changes in inflation 
are absorbed by nominal rates. Including the business cycle, he found that the explanatory 
power of the inflationary variable increased with the addition of a real output variable in 
the model. 
His results on the role of real output in determination were, contrary to the findings of 
Eliot (1977). Eliot found no significant relationship between interest rates and real output. 
He did find a negative and significant relationship between interest rates and the current 
actual rate of inflation. To Fieldstien (1980), the Fisherian hypothesis would only hold if 
real interest rates, costs of capital to the firm and real return to savers are equivalent as in 
a market left free with no government interferences; otherwise with taxation policy the 
hypothesis will not hold. He developed a model to test for the role of taxation of interest 
rate income in determining the nominal rates. The argument was that in order to 
compensate the lender for the inflation, nominal rates should be set above Fisherian 
rates. Tanzi tested for the effect of income tax on the nominal interest rates, but found no 
significant results. 
Edwards and Khan (1985) developed an interest rate model for a semi-open economy 
where both domestic and foreign factors were considered to be vital in determining 
nominal interest rates. They argued that although the capital account of the balance of 
payments may not be completely open, if there is trade with the rest of the world, then 
the open economy factors are expected to indirectly influence domestic interest rates. 
For example, terms of trade shocks can produce changes in real income and prices that 
will affect domestic demand for credit and thus the equilibrium rate of interest. To Edwards 
and Khan, expected real interest rates deviate from the long-run equilibrium due to 
monetary disequilibrium where excess demand (supply) of real money balances yields a 
temporary higher (lower) real interest rate. As the money market goes back to equilibrium, 
the real rate of interest will equal the long-run rate so that conditions in the money market 
play no role in explaining the real rates of interest. 
Angeloni and Prati (1993) expanded the domestic interest rate model to include the 
influence of foreign interest rates, expected rate of depreciation and the sterilization 
behaviour of the central bank. They examined the relationship between bank liquidity 
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and money market interest rates for Italy using daily data from January 1991 to July 
1992. Their results strongly supported the existence of liquidity effects on money market 
interest rates. Interest rates were found to be driven almost entirely by exchange factors 
either directly or through the liquidity effects of central bank intervention. 
Gupta and Gupta (1994) examined the relative importance of international capital 
market integration in determining interest rates in selected industrial and developing 
countries. They modeled real interest rate parity as: 
('•, - O = (',- O - - B > 
avoiding the weakness of covered and uncovered interest rate parities. To them the 
differences between nominal interest rates (/ - i*) are explained in the bonds market 
while price differences (BI -5'') are explained in the goods market. Open market factors 
were captured by the short-term current account balances (CAB) plus a country risk 
(CR) factor as a proxy for expected rate of change of exchange rate. For domestic monetary 
policies, they argued that the setting of the central bank discount rate (CDR) and policies 
targeting the domestic credit growth (MPV) are the most direct instrument for influencing 
domestic interest rates, if capital market integration is weak. They estimated the following 
equation for 15 countries, 6 industrial and 9 relatively open developing countries: 
(/-/*) = {p-p*) + z. cab + y.cdr + x.mpv + d.cr 
The results indicated that domestic and world inflation rates are highly significant in 
explaining cross-country differentials between domestic interest rates and world interest 
rates, while the country risk variable was insignificant. There was a considerable difference 
between industrial and developing countries in the relative significance and role of the 
CAB and domestic monetary policy variables in determining domestic interest rate 
differentials across the sample countries. 
To conclude, both the empirical and the theoretical works show that interest rates are 
influenced by internal and external factors, including monetary factors and macroeconomic 
policies and other factors outside the money market. 
Methodology 
The interest rate model 
The theoretical model of interest rate determination proposed by Edwards and Khan 
(1985) was adopted to analyse the interest rate market in Kenya. Kenya is a semi open 
economy, with imports and exports comprising about 20% of total GDP, and with 
restrictions in the capital account. Following the Edwards and Khan argument, if the 
capital account of the balance of payments is restricted, and the country is trading with 
the rest of the world, it is expected that both closed economy and open economy factors 
influence domestic interest rates. 
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We start with the standard Fisherian equation of nominal interests: 
(standard Fisherian equation) 
i = the nominal rate of interest 
rr = real (ex-ante) rate of interest 
n = the expected rate of inflation 
Unlike Fisher's assumption of constant real rates of interest, the model assumed that 
the real interest rate deviates from its long-run value (p) with disequilibrium in the money 
market. Liquidity effects thus allow real interest rates to vary in the short run. 
rr = p - EMS + w( (2) 
Substituting for the real interest rates in Equation 1, 
it = p- EMSt + 7t:t + w (3) 
EMS = excess money supply 
p = parameter ( X > 0) 
wt = random error term 
Although the condition in the money market can influence the inflation rate, the 
assumption made was that expected rate of inflation has no direct effect on real interest 
rates. 
Expected inflation and excess money supply are unobservable variables. Expected 
inflation rate may be specified in several ways using adaptive expectation, rational 
expectation or adaptive aggressive habitual model. An assumption could also be made 
that actual and expected rates of inflation are equal assuming perfect foresight. There is 
no compelling theoretical reasoning for preferring one method over another, however: 
the choice is ultimately an empirical one (Edwards and Khan, 1985). 
Excess money supply was defined as: 
EMSt = logMi - LogMdt 14) 
where: 
Mt = actual stock of real money balance 
Mf = desired equilibrium stock of real money balance 
It is expected that with financial reforms, there is substitution between money and 
goods and money and other financial assets. In Kenya, for example, treasury bills are I lie 
most relevant alternative asset to money (Mwega, 1993). 
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Therefore, demand for money is a function of two opportunity cost variables, the 
expected rate of inflation and interest rate and a scale variable, the real income. The 
equilibrium demand for money was expressed in log form as: 
log Mf = ao + a , log yt + a2(p + i f ) - a , if t (5) 
with long-run demand for money as a function of the equilibrium nominal rate of interest. 
Assuming real money balances adjust according to: 
AlogM( = f3 (log Mdt - log Mt [) (6) 
AlogM( = logM( - log Mi X 
A = first difference operator 
j6 = coefficient of adjustment (0 <f i < 1) 
then Equation 6 introduces the process by which nominal interest rates return eventually 
to equilibrium. 
Rewrite Equation 6 as: 
log Mt = J8 log M'\ + ( 1-J3) log Mm (6a) 
and combine equations 6a and 4 to obtain: 
EMSt = (I -P) (log M. , - log M") (7) 
combine equations 1,5, and 7 to derive the reduced form equation for nominal interest 
rates as: 
h = To + log y, + 72 l o g mtA + % log if t + w (8) 
To introduce the open market factors, Edwards and Khan assumed an uncovered 
interest arbitrage relation assuming no impediments to capital flows. Domestic and foreign 
interest rates are closely linked, especially in a world with no transaction costs and risk-
neutral agents. 
i=rt + e, (9) 
I*l = world interest rates 
e/ = expected rate of change 
There are possibilities that because of friction arising from transaction costs, or 
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information lags, domestic interest rates respond with delay to any change in foreign 
rates or exchange rate expectation. Modeling in a partial adjustment framework then 
A i = 9 f t r , + e)-iit] (10) 
and domestic nominal interest rate 
i, = 9 ( r , + e) + (i-0) (rr, + K;) ( ID 
combining the closed and open economy extremes using the linear combination method. 
Then the following nominal interest rate model is specified, assuming a lag in response 
of domestic interest rate: 
i, =y/(ri + e)+(l-xi/)it l + (l-y/) (rrf + n;) (12) 
(//• = index measuring the degree of financial openness 
1 = fully open 
0 = fully closed 
0 < \ f f < I then semi-open 
Although in an open economy the demand for money function should be generalized 
to allow for foreign interest rate and the expected change in the exchange rate, the effect 
of currency substitution was not considered in the model. From equations 4 ,5 and 12 the 
following reduced form expression for nominal interest rates in a semi-open economy 
was derived: 
it = a0 + a ] ( f ( + e) + a 2 log yt + a log mM +a47ft + <x/ ( ) + v (13) 
If we assume no lag in response of the domestic interest rate, then y/ = 1 and the lagged 
interest rate term will drop from the model. 
it = «0 + « ; ( f + e)+ a2log y, + a log /n , +aAn\ + v, (14) 
From the reduced form model, interest rates are influenced by inflationary conditions, 
open market factors including foreign interest rates, and the expected depreciation of 
local currency, monetary condition and output levels. Following the general-to-specific 
approach to modeling, or the data generating process, the vector of variables was defined 
for X as 
X=(7f, e t, i, (m-p), (y-p), f + e) 
where: 
7f = expected inflation (rate of inflation) 
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et - expected depreciation of local currency 
T - world interest rate 
i = domestic interest rates 
m-p = real money balances 
y-p = real income 
Nominal domestic interest rate was defined as the 90-day treasury bill rate. Treasury bill 
rates are used as a yardstick for other short-term interest rates. Treasury bills are the best 
alternative financial assets, and therefore banking institutions in competition for deposits 
respond to treasury bill rates. A model was also estimated with the deposit rates. 
Inflation rate is captured as the change in the composite consumer price index. The 
study assumes perfect foresight so that the actual and expected inflation are equal. Inflation 
captures the Fisherian effect. Inflation also forms a large element of nominal interest 
rates so that an increase in price levels increases the level of interest rates. Fisher assumed 
a positive relationship between inflation and interest rates where an increase in price 
results in an increase in nominal value of goods and services and a rise in demand for 
money, leading to an increase in level of interest rate. 
The open market economy factors are captured using the interest differential assuming 
the uncovered interest rate parity. Foreign interest rates were defined as the three-month 
libor rate while the foreign exchange rate was defined as a weighted average rate with 
llie major trading partners. It is expected that a rise in foreign interest rates leads to 
capital outflow, reducing money supply and increasing the level of domestic interest 
rate. On the other hand, an expected decline in the value of local currency leads to an 
increase in demand for money resulting in an increase in inflation and nominal interest 
rates. 
Disequilibrium in the money market is captured using the lagged real money stock. 
Various factors contribute to an increase in money supply including budget deficit. An 
increase in government spending exceeding generated revenue leads to large deficits, 
necessitating an increase in foreign and local borrowing. At the local level, borrowing, 
especially from the banking sector, leads to monetary expansion and this may result in 
an increase in interest rates. The proponents of financial reform call for sound budgetary 
discipline for sustainability of liberalized interest rates. The expected sign of money 
stock is therefore positive. However, with the portfolio allocation behaviour, monetary 
expansion may lower the interest rates. 
The real GDP variable captures business fluctuations. In the absence of monthly data 
lor the total output, the study used imports plus exports as a proxy. The model was 
estimated using monthly data for the period July 1991 to August 1996. 
Time series properties of the variables 
Before estimating Equation 14, time series properties of the variables were established. 
It is essential that variables be stationary before any meaningful regression is carried out. 
A non- stationary series has no finite variance asymptotically and therefore many of the 
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standard theorems of asymptotic analysis are invalid. If a series is non-stationary, one is 
likely to finish up with a model showing promising diagnostics test statistics even in the 
case where there is no sense in the regression analysis. 
The order of integration of each variable is identified using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
class of unit root tests and the Sargan Bhargava Durbin Watson (SBDW) test. The Dl; 
method is a test on the size of the coefficient in the equation. 
X, = «0 + + u< (15) 
The DF tests the hypothesis (j> = 1, the so-called unit root test. This is based on the 
estimation of an equivalent regression equation to (1) namely 
AXt = « 0 + 8 X t l + ut (16) 
with <{> = (1 + 8) 
Equation 16 tests for negativity of 8 
H0: 8=0 
H0: 8<0 
If the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted, it implies 
that <|) < 1 and that X( is integrated of order zero (stationary), i.e. X is I (0). If the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected then the X( series has a unit root and is non-stationary in 
levels. It may be integrated of order higher than zero or may not be integrated at all. 
The next step is to test whether the order of integration is one by differencing AX 
further until the order of integration is established or until it is established that X cannot 
be made stationary by differencing. A weakness of the DF test is that it does not consider 
the possibility of auto correlation in the error term. If U is not white noise, then the OLS 
estimate will not be efficient. The augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used to overcome 
the problem. 
The ADF equivalent of Equation 15 is the following: 
AX( = ccQ + <3X , + tZAX m + ut (17) 
Again the hypothesis is as in DF, so that when the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative accepted the series is stationary at levels. If the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the series is non-stationary in levels but could be stationary at higher levels or 
not stationary at all. The estimation procedure for ADF is similar to DF test. 
The SBDW test is based on the standard Durbin Watson statistic but is applied to the 
levels of individual series. It is a quick guide to check whether a variable is integrated of 
order zero. The SBDW is defined as: 
SBDW = I (X, - X ,)2 / 1 (X, - X)2 (18) 
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Unlike the DF tests, the test is against the null hypothesis that the series is 1(0) in 
which case the value of the DW statistic will tend towards a value of 2. If the statistic is 
low, there is evidence of an 1(1) series. The unit root test results in Table 4 and Figure 4 
show that the variables are 1(1) processes. 
Before estimation, the data series was "deseasonalized" to save on the degrees of 
freedom and also because monthly data are subjected to seasonal variations and this was 
not the main focus of the study. For deseasonalization, the following regression is 
estimated: 
X = a + J3,S1 +fi2S2+ +finS„ + I , (19) 
where X is the data series, a is a constant, S the seasons and Xt is an error term. The 
fitted values (X) from this equation become the "seasonal filter" and the residuals ( £ t ) is 
the seasonal adjusted series, which is then used in the analysis. However, Equation 19 
can only be run if Xt is stationary. If X is trending, the equation must be run with AX on 
the left-hand side as follows: 
AX, = ao +fi2S2+ +J3nSn + I , (20) 
Given that the results are I (1), the series were deseasonalized by running Equation 
20 and the seasonally adjusted residuals (X *) obtained. To recover X, we add Xn to X* 
for each series (X** = X(I + X*). X* 
Tests for cointegration were carried out and a cointegrating vector normalized with 
the interest rate variable. The following are the results: 
i - 0.151forex + 0.48 income - 0.06 cpi + 0.02 M2 (21) 
The next stage was to estimate the interest rate model. We started with a general over 
paramaterized statistical model. It was then reduced using the parsimonious method to 
get an interpretable model (preferred model). Given that parameters are likely to be 
unstable in the liberalization process, single shocks with an impulse dummy were modeled. 
This followed recursive test stability of the model (Figure 5) showing instability of the 
coefficient values in the period of study. The error-correction term was steady throughout 
and significantly different from zero. The results of the preferred model are given in 
Table 5. The preferred model was then solved to show the reduced results of the analysis 
(Table 6). 
The statistical significance of the coefficient of the error-correction term (ECM-1) 
led to the conclusion that there is a long-run relationship among interest rates, inflation, 
money supply and income. The speed of adjustment of interest rates was 77% to 
disequilibrium in the market in the reduced results (Table 6). This conforms to the theory 
that as the money market returns to its equilibrium position, interest rates tend, towards 
the equilibrium position (see Edwards and Khan, 1985). It reflects Adams (1992a) results 
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that there is a long-run relationship between money and income, therefore concluding 
that as an equilibrium is attained in the money market, so will the real market realize an 
equilibrium income. 
Table 4: Unit Root Tests 
Variables DF ADF RADF* Order of 
integration 
Lag 
length 
CPI -6.8348 -2.9276 -1.697 1(1) 6 
Tbills -1.445 -2.2421 -2.112 1(1) 6 
Forex -1.320 -2.544 -2.889 1(1) 6 
M2 -3.780 -2.877 -0.626 1(1) 6 
Income -5.446 -2.321 -3.297 K1) 6 
* RADF is ADF estimated recursively in order to identify shocks or structural breaks. In all cases the variable 
had one or two shocks that were modelled, thus improving the power of the tests. This is because DF class of 
tests require that errors be serially correlated or homogenous. Shocks in the variables will contribute to the low 
power of this class of tests (Ndung'u, 1997). 
Key: 
CPI 
Tbill 
Forex = 
M2 
Income = 
measured as the rated of change consumer price index 
treasury bill rate (90 days) 
foreign factor (i + e) 
broad money 
proxied by (X+M) 
The dummy variables were introduced in the model to capture responses to shocks, ll 
is clear from the results that interest rates responded more to the shocks than to the 
fundamentals. Interest rate liberalization was accompanied by inflationary conditions as 
a result of high money supply. To mop up the excess money supply, sale of treasury bills 
went up in 1993, increasing the treasury bill rate. This was coupled with devaluation of 
the Kenya shilling and high fiscal deficit. As expected this spurred inflation, which 
reached a peak in 1993, resulting in increased interest rates. Dummy variable D93-3 is 
positive and significant, showing an increased level of interest rates by 3.3% with the 
experience. Although interest rates reduced after the floating of the exchange rate followed 
by appreciation of the Kenya shilling, dummy D93-11 indicates that there was an overall 
increase in interest rates by 0.13%. This could be attributed to the increased cash ratio 
that accompanied the tight monetary policy adopted (Figures 6a and b). A general decline-
in interest rates was realized in 1994 even with increased cash ratio (D94-1) following 
the trade liberalization activities and relaxation of the cash ratio (D94-9). A further decline-
in interest rates accompanied the tight prudential regulations beginning in 1995, and tlic 
realized decline in inflation rate. However, as inflation turned upward in 1996, interest 
rates increased. 
Note that most of the fundamentals played an insignificant role in explaining the 
variations in interest rates. This is because the treasury bill rate was not used as a monetary 
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policy tool, but a tool to finance government deficit from the non-banking domestic 
sources. No wonder then the treasury bill rate was even higher than the lending rate in 
1993/94 period. The foreign factor (forex) showing the impact of interest rate differential 
in the domestic interest rate indicates that as the gap widened between the domestic and 
loreign interest rate, there was an inflow of capital. This resulted in increased money 
supply and increased interest rates. 
The estimated model was well fitted, with the errors having no memory so that the 
data are admissible, and the coefficient not equal to zero (Figure 7). 
Table 5: Preferred model 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant -.0003 -0.576 
Tbill-1 -.0364 5.951 
Tbill-2 .1304 1.668 
Forex .0942 7.665 
Income -.0002 -0.332 
M2 -0.0314 -3.876 
M2-1 .0167 2.410 
M2-2 .0205 2.590 
CPI -.0454 -3.743 
CPI-2 .0272 2.452 
D941 -0.0183 -6.326 
D949 .0099 3.273 
ECM-1 -.3902 -4.678 
D933 .0169 5.258 
D9311 -.0162 -5.619 
D955 -.0074 -2.390 
D962 .0062 2.248 
F|16,41) 
DW 
RSS 
.921021 
29.883(0.000) 
0.00266 
1.86 
0.00029(17,58) 
Diagnostic tests 
AR 1-4 F(4,370 
ARCH 4 F(4,33) 
Normality X 2 (2) 
Reset F( 1,40) 
= 1.1249 (0.3597) 
= 0.5532(0.6980) 
= 1.4425(0.486) 
= 0.031418(0.8602) 
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Figure 5: Recursive graphs 
Figure 6a: Impact variables 
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EXRATE = Exchange rate; MCR = Cash ratio; TBILLS = Treasury bill rate; MSM2 = Broad money supply 
(M2). 
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Figure 6b: Interest rates response to impact variables 
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Figure 7: Fitted treasury bill rate results 
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Table 6: The reduced results 
Variable Coefficient SE t-values 
Constant -.0006 .001 0.60 
Forex .1865 .033 5.65 
Income -.0004 .001 0.40 
M2 .0116 .031 0.37 
CPI -.0361 .035 1.03 
D941 -.0361 .007 5.16 
D949 .0195 .007 2.79 
ECM-1 .7722 .248 3.11 
D933 .0334 .008 4.18 
D9311 -.0321 .007 4.59 
D955 -.0147 .006 2.45 
D962 .0122 .006 2.03 
Wald test X 2 (11 ) = 77.153 (0.0000)* 
IV. Conclusions 
The study tracks down the financial liberalization process in Kenya and empirically tests 
for the interest rate determination in a liberalized market. Several conclusions were drawn 
from the analysis: 
1. Although emphasis in the literature on sequencing of financial reforms is first of 
all on achieving macroeconomic stability and other sectoral liberalization before 
financial liberalization (Mirakhor and Villanueva, 1992; Edwards, 1984; Montiel, 
1995), the process in Kenya shows that: 
8 Financial liberalization was followed by other reforms, including trade 
liberalization. 
9 Macroeconomic economic stability was not achieved before liberalizing 
interest rates. And even immediately after the liberalization of interest rates, 
inflationary pressure was increasing, making it impossible to achieve real 
interest rates. 
• Fiscal deficit was growing and increasingly financed from the local market 
using treasury bills. 
• Credit controls were relaxed when the banking sector was experiencing 
high liquidity and there were no prospective investment opportunities. 
This shows that the prerequisites for financial liberalization and decontrol of interest 
rates were not put in place. 
2. The expectation in theory is that with liberalization, interest rates will be positive 
in real terms and with increased efficiency in intermediation, the spread between 
the lending and deposit rates will narrow. The study shows that: 
8 Positive real interest rates were not achieved until 1996 when inflation rate 
took a downward trend. But, prospects of keeping them positive are narrow 
with the upward trending inflation rate beginning in 1997. 
8 The spread between lending and deposit rates widened with liberalization, 
while the short-term rates increased at a faster rate compared with long-
term rates resulting in a negatively sloped yield curve. 
8 The treasury bill rate operated as the yardstick for short-term rates. 
Commercial banks increased deposit rates to compete for the deposits held 
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by the non-banking public. 
Clearly, efficiency has not been achieved in intermediation of financial assets. 
This was reinforced by the oligopolistic structure of the market, where the sector 
is dominated by a few commercial banks. 
3. The theory of financial repression also argues for competitiveness in the market, 
with diversified financial assets. The results indicate: 
8 Attempts to introduce the money, secondary and capital markets 
8 A widening range of financial assets with diversified basket of treasury 
bills and introduction of certificates of deposits 
8 Review of the Banking Act, strengthening the role of the central bank 
8 Tightening of prudential regulations for the financial institutions 
4. However, the financial markets are still in their infant stage, and the central bank 
has not yet gained independence in its operations. At the same time, the "political 
banks" make it difficult to successfully implement the prudential regulations. 
5. With a free market, the fundamentals are expected to contribute substantially in 
explaining the variations in interest rates. However, the results indicate that the 
fundamentals played an insignificant role in explaining variations in interest rates. 
It is the monetary policy and fiscal policy activities that seem to have had significant 
impact on the levels of interest rates in the short run. 
6. However, in the long run the fundamentals play a major role as indicated by the 
significant error-correction term. Both internal and external factors interact together 
to determine interest rates. 
7. To conclude then, although lots of efforts have been put in the financial sector 
liberalization process, there are still some loose ends that need to be tightened if 
positive impacts are to be realized. 
Notes: 
1 Kenya Commercial Bank sold shares in 1988 (20%), 1990 (10%) and 1996 (10%). 
National Bank of Kenya sold 20% in 1994 and 20% in 1996. 
2 M2/GDP is used as a proxy for financial deepening. The higher the ratio, the 
higher the level of monetization of the economy. 
3 As early as in the 1974-1978 Development Plan, the government recognized the 
weaknesses in the financial sector, stating that "the financial sector is under-
developed and not serving the interest of national development." 
4 In the 1984-1989 Development Plan the government states that the regulatory 
framework within which banks and NBFIs operated warranted review. 
5 Credit guidelines were aimed at ensuring adequate flow of funds to targeted sectors, 
i.e., agriculture, manufacturing, export business and construction. Lending rates 
were set to facilitate the allocation and reinforced with the administrative 
mechanism for allocation of credit. The Banking Act limited commercial banks 
to invest 15% of funds to long-term immovable property in order to protect the 
liquidity of the banks. 
6 The minimum saving deposit rate was raised from 3% to 5% in mid 1974; in June 
1980 it was raised to 6%, June 1981 to 8%, September 1981 to 10%, December 
1982 to 12.5% and June 1984 to 11%. 
7 In the Central Bank Monthly Economic Review, September 1995, the following 
reasons were given for the high lending rates and the widening spread: inflationary 
expectations, inadequate competitiveness in banking, excess demand for loans, 
and the operations of monetary and fiscal policies. 
8 In 1996 minimum paid up capital was raised: local banks - Ksh75 million; foreign 
incorporated banks - Ksh200 million; local mortgage Ksh200 million; foreign-
Ksh500 million with assigned capital amounting to a minimum of Kshl65 million; 
local finance firms - Ksh 375 milllion together with unimpaired reserves of no 
less than 7.5% of their total deposit liabilities. 
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Appendix 
Financial sector reform process 1989-1996 
1989 
Jun - FSAP credit approved 
Jul - FSAP credit effective and indirect monetary policy measures initiated 
Nov - Legislation providing for establishment of Capital Market Authority passed 
by parliament 
Minimum saving deposit rate payable by banks and NBFIs raised by 0.5% 
and maximum lending rate for loans and advances not exceeding three years 
raised to 15.5% 
* During the year the Banking Act (1968) was revised, strengthening the activities of the 
central bank 
1990 
Jan - Capital Market Authority established 
Mar - Rate on one-year treasury bond increased by 0.5% to enhance attractiveness 
Apr - Minimum saving deposit rate increased by 1% together with maximum 
lending rate for loans with maturities up to 3 years. 
Treasury bill rate increased by 1 % 
Requirement removed that ceilings on loan interest rate include all lending 
related charges and fees, permitting institutions to set their lending rates to 
reflect current market conditions 
Nov - Treasury bill rate fully liberalized 
1991 
June - Consolidated Bank of Kenya Act effected, providing for the transfer of assets 
and liabilities of banks and NBFIs with solvency problems to Consolidated 
Bank of Kenya 
Jul Interest rate fully liberalized 
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Oct - Convertible foreign exchange bearer certificate (Forexcs) introduced, 
marking the first step to liberalization of the foreign exchange market 
Nov - Exchange control account partially relaxed by withdrawing the clause 
covering declaration of foreign currency held by incoming travelers 
* During the year the trading flow for NSE established 
1992 
Jan - Minimum capital/assets ratio raised from 5.5% to 7.5% and prudential 
guidelines prepared to encourage self- regulation; including code of conduct 
of directors, chief executive and other employees, duties and responsibilities 
of directors, chief executives and management, appointment duties and 
responsibilities of external auditors and provision of bad and doubtful 
advances and loans 
Mar - Ksh500 million in treasury bills acquired by CBK to replenish its stock of 
trading portfolio 
Apr - Secondary market for Forexcs's established 
May - Marginal cost raised by 1% for additional increments of Ksh50 million in 
advances and rediscount of treasury bills and other government securities 
to ensure that commercial banks with overdrafts with central bank exceeding 
Ksh 50 million are appropriately sanctioned 
Aug - Retention scheme introduced allowing 100% retention of foreign exchange 
earnings from non-traditional exports 
Oct - Commercial banks allowed to borrow foreign exchange currency to finance 
tea and coffee purchases in auctions 
Banks allowed to send dollar accounts for coffee and tea buyers ad sellers 
New penalties announced for commercial banks failing to observe the 
mandatory cash and liquidity ratios 
Nov - Retention scheme extended to cover traditional exports of goods at 50% 
1993 
Feb - Retention scheme extended to service sector at 50% 
Foreign exchange allocation by central bank abolished 
Mar Foreign exchange certificate made redeemable at market exchange rate 
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Devaluation of 25% of official shilling exchange rate 
Retention account suspended 
Margin on central bank advances and discounts to banks increased 
Cash ratio increased from 6% to 8% 
Devaluation by 33% of official shilling exchange rate 
Maturity life for securities to be eligible for rediscounting reduced to 45 
days or less 
New penalty for banks failing to observe the mandatory cash ratio announced 
Re-introduction of retention scheme - 50% of all foreign exchange 
Further liberalization of foreign exchange system allowing commercial banks 
to effect foreign payments for their private clients without referring to the 
Central Bank of Kenya 
Import licensing system abolished short-list of prohibited and restricted 
imports 
Revolution of restriction on importation of assembled commercial vehicles 
Maximum import tariff reduced from 60% to 50% and tariff rate bands 
from 9 to 7 
Introduction of one-way foreign exchange auction system 
Cash ratio raised from 8% to 10% 
Paper eligible for rediscounting restricted by lowering maturities 
a) Treasury bill (half way). 
b) Treasury bonds (45 days or less). 
Securities accepted as eligible as collateral for overnight loans 
A two tier foreign auction system introduced 
Nairobi clearing house new arrangements effected to eliminate automatic 
provision of central bank credit to banks 
Registration of foreign exchange certificate holders with banks in order to 
buy them back at negotiated or market price 
Registration of foreign exchange certificate by banks with Central Bank 
Shilling exchange rate allowed to float freely 
Cash ratio raised from 10% to 12% with balance above the minimum 
requirement to earn interest at 35% per annum 
Central bank started daily foreign exchange transactions with commercial 
banks 
Commercial banks allowed to continue purchasing foreign exchange for oil 
and petroleum products from the market and central bank. 
Central bank continued entering into forward contracts for purchase of oil 
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and related products out at market rates 
Credit guidelines abolished 
Cash ratio raised from 12% to 14% with excess balances paid 35% interest 
per annum 
Restriction removed on remittance of profits, dividends and expatriate 
earnings 
Residents allowed to borrow abroad up to US$1 million 
* During the year central bank operated with a tight monetary policy with high money 
supply. Treasury bill diversified to accommodate diverse liquidity preference of investors, 
so that the 30-, 60- and 180-day bills were introduced adding to the only 90-day bill in 
the market. 
1994 
Feb - Cash ratio increased from 14% to 16% with interest paid on bank balances 
with bank in excess of 10% reduced from 25% to 20% 
Foreign exchange retention raised to 100% 
Residents allowed to open foreign currency accounts with banks in Kenya 
Restriction on local borrowing by foreign controlled companies removed 
Foreigners allowed to pay hotel bills and air tickets in either foreign or 
Kenya currency 
Mar - Liquidity ratio for commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to 
be maintained at 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively, above the current 
commercial bank cash ratio requirement 
Cash ratio raised from 16% to 20% and interest payment on commercial 
bank deposits at the bank withdrawn 
Apr - Open market operations sale of Treasury bills to be at least 0.5 percent 
below the weekly average tender rate 
Commercial banks to borrow from the bank for a maximum of 4 consecutive 
days and no more than 10 days in any one month 
Jun - Kenya accepted obligations of Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund 
Sep - Foreign currency account holders encouraged to retain some of their funds 
overseas under the care of commercial banks 
Commercial banks required to back the funds retained overseas 100% by 
foreign assets 
Restated determination of the exchange rate by market forces 
Cash ratio lowered 20% - 18% 
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Announced requirement for NBFIs to open account with central bank for 
puiposes of maintaining cash ratio 
Authorization and licensing of foreign exchange bureaus announced 
Foreign investors allowed to participate in stock exchange market under 
guided policy on ownership 
Reaffirmation that the regulatory body of the stock exchange would be 
Capital Market Authority 
Commercial banks to observe foreign exchange exposure limit of 20% of 
the paid up capital plus unimpaired reserves 
Newly converted NBFIs to observe half the mandatory 18% of the cash 
ratio 
A bill minimum 5 days introduced. Firms listed by NSE allowed to issue 
commercial paper and treasury bill of 5 days maturity 
Balance of the newly converted banks to be 0.135 of the institutions' total 
deposits from 31.5.95. 
NBFIs subjected to the mandatory cash ratio requirement; requirement 
initially set at 1.8% of eligible deposits and raised progressively to 18% by 
December 1995 
Tightened conditions for overnight loans and rediscounting at central bank 
by commercial bank 
Treasury bills held at 50% of life to maturity for overnight loans or 75% for 
rediscount were eligible. Also bills to have two clear working days to 
maturity. Banks lending in the inter-bank market not allowed to borrow 
overnight from central bank 
Commercial banks to submit weekly foreign currency exposure return every 
Monday; off balance sheet items excluded from computation of foreign 
currency exposure, aiming to minimize foreign currency exposure risk and 
enhance the stability of the financial system 
Investment compensation fund established to protect investors against losses 
arising from equity trading 
Foreign capital regulations revised to enable foreigners to own up to 40% 
of local company listed in NSE and equity participation by a single investor 
increased from 2.5% to 5.0% 
Liquidity ratio fixed at 25% for both banks and NBFIs and 20% for 
mortgages finance companies 
Minimum investment in treasury bills under OMO lowered to Kshl00,000 
from Kshl000,000 
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Procedure for renewal of licences by banks and NBFIs modified 1st year 
licenses of branches to be computed and charged on a pro-rated basis; 
thereafter full year licenses fees to be paid for the head office and all branches 
simultaneously 
Sep - Commercial banks allowed to exclude deposits of financial institutions from 
cash ratio base 
Commercial banks to submit monthly breakdown of government and 
parastatal deposits in addition to monthly statistic returns 
Oct - Central bank launches a redesigned treasury bill that conforms with the 
magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) cheque clearing system. The 
new instrument serves as a bill and a cheque 
Banking Act Amended (27th October) 
Dec - Central bank starts paying 5% interest on all cash balances held by 
commercial banks and NBFIs at Central Bank to facilitate a reduction in 
banking lending rates 
NBFIs required to invest in treasury bills a minimum of 50% of their liquid 
asset withdrawn 
Repeal of Exchange Control Act 
Cash ratio raised to 18% 
Central bank display OMO rates on the Reuter screen, to encourage 
independent decision on quotation for purchase of the treasury bills 
Measures taken to improve effectiveness of secondary trading in financial 
instrument 
Treasury bills for 30, 90, and 180 days replaced by 28, 91 and 182 days; 
while 60 and 270 days were discontinued 
Cash ratio requirement relaxed to allow fluctuations up to minimum 15% 
but an average 18% for 14 days 
5% interest that commercial banks received on the cash balances with the 
central bank discontinued 
* During the year minimum capital paid up was raised. 
Source: Central Bank Annual Reports, various issues; government reports: issues including budget 
speeches, Economic Swveys. 
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